



**THE CANADIAN WHEAT BOARD
AND
BARLEY MARKETING**

by

Richard Gray

Objectives

- To report on the results of the 2005 study by Schmitz, Schmitz and Gray
- To be available to answer questions about the study and provide clarification
- This report deals with comparing the total barley revenue and average prices with current system versus multiple sellers
- I will not address issues of producer choice or producer freedom

Last Caveat

- I have often been put in the camp of “friend of the CWB”
- Based on my own research and on the evidence in the economic literature I currently strongly hold the view that the CWB has a positive effect on average producer income
- I also strongly hold the view that the decisions about the future of the CWB should be made as part of democratic process where average producer impacts is only part of information that should feed into a democratic decision

Outline

- Background to the study
- Canada's place in world barley
- Basis and other issues
- Methodology for estimating revenue affects
- Study results
- Conclusions and need for further work
- Discussion and questions

Background to the study

THE CANADIAN WHEAT BOARD AND BARLEY MARKETING

by

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Background to the study

- A updated look - Previous study 1985/86 - 1994/95 this study the 1995/96 to 2003/04
- Funded by the CWB
- Used actual CWB transaction data - pricing in each market is important information


Four questions

- 1) Does the CWB deliver higher returns to Western Canada's feed-barley and malting-barley producers than would be the case in a multiple-seller environment?
- 2) Are there benefits provided to producers through the price pooling operations of the CWB, i.e., risk management?
- 3) What are the inherent problems of arbitrage between the annual pooled return provided by the CWB and the cash off-Board market price?
- 4) Are there additional marketing costs that are unique to the operation of the CWB as a single-desk seller?

Canada's place in world barley

- Feed grain market very small player
- Malting barley and barley malt
 - More significant in North America and world
 - Global malting-barley trade increased 44% from 3.2 mmt in 1994/95 to 4.6 mmt in 2001/02

Became feed deficit in western Canada



Canada is large in Malt Barley Exports

Table 2.7: Malting-Barley Trade Shares: Canada, Australia, and the European Union, 1995/96 to 2002/03

	Canada	Australia	European Union
	<i>percentage</i>		
1995/96	38.6	48.7	6.8
1996/97	35.2	48.5	10.9
1997/98	41.8	27.9	16.8
1998/99	26.2	40.6	19.6
1999/00	27.4	31.3	34.1
2000/01	27.0	36.6	29.9
2001/02	25.0	39.4	27.1
2002/03	27.7	41.2	21.0

Source: CWB estimates.

Canadian and US barley acreage




Table 2.11: Canada: Barley Supplies and Disposition, 1995/96 to 2002/03

Year	Production	Imports	Domestic Use		Exports		Ending Stocks
			Feed and Seed	Malting Barley	Barley Malt	Feed Barley	
<i>thousand mt</i>							
1995/96	13,033	10	9,848	922	1,426	910	1,740
1996/97	15,562	19	10,000	938	1,392	2,047	2,919
1997/98	13,357	12	10,960	929	1,276	851	2,459
1998/99	12,709	55	10,424	960	969	131	2,737
1999/00	13,196	33	10,338	1,058	1,152	575	2,838
2000/01	13,229	40	10,585	1,059	1,121	820	2,516
2001/02	10,846	112	9,356	973	956	136	2,048
2002/03	7,489	259	7,197	807	303	10	1,475

Source: Compiled by the CWB (2004).


Survey of Previous Studies

- Summarized and examined many other studies
- No evidence of higher marketing costs

The theory of single desk selling

- As long as some markets are more price sensitive than others revenue can be increased by charging different prices in different markets

Price Discrimination with 2 markets



Our Analysis

- Divided the Canadian Barley each year into 10 market segments
- For each year calculated the elasticity of each demand curve based on prices received in each market
- We varied the demand elasticity to reflect corn imports
- Example 2000/2001 crop year

Market	FOB Price	Quantity Sold	Market Revenue	Demand Elasticity
	<i>\$/mt</i>	<i>000 mt</i>	<i>\$ million</i>	
Feed-Barley Markets				
Japan	160.19	241	39	-7.18
United States	145.86	7	1	-18.31
Rest of the World	145.15	324	47	-20.00
Canada Domestic	151.49	10,179	1,542	-13.96
6-Row Malting-Barley Markets				
Canada Domestic	208.35	83	17	Š1.03
United States	209.25	531	111	Š1.03
Rest of the World	214.29	152	32	Š1.03
2-Row Malting-Barley Markets				
Canada Domestic	218.95	229	50	Š1.03
United States	239.36	452	108	Š1.03
Rest of the World	219.53	1,237	272	Š1.03

Counterfactual

- For each year, given the demand curves for each market we simulated what would happen with multiple sellers
- With many sellers (ie. 40,000 farmers) we assumed that all markets would trade at single price except that malting barley would always retain a \$15 margin over feed barley because of extra costs
- We compared the observed actual revenue received by the CWB with that of the multiple seller estimate for each year

Results

- Under multiple sellers malt sales went up and malting premium collapsed in most years
- This makes sense given supply versus demand for malting
- This reduced total producer revenue
- Very small positive impact on feed barley revenue

Multiple-Seller Marketing System 1995/96 to 2003/04

	Feed	6-Row	2-Row	Total	Domestic
	Barley	Malt	Malt	Producer	Demand
Crop Year	Price	Price	Price	Revenue	Elasticity
	<i>\$/mt</i>	<i>\$/mt</i>	<i>\$/mt</i>	<i>\$ million</i>	
1995/96	4.23	0.48	(34.27)	(21)	Š 1.57
1996/97	1.47	(18.59)	(41.21)	(43)	Š 1.43
1997/98	1.06	(43.59)	(44.70)	(88)	Š 5.51
1998/99	2.33	(49.30)	(26.75)	(42)	Š 2.02
1999/00	1.62	(60.96)	(45.64)	(78)	Š 2.80
2000/01	0.47	(43.19)	(57.17)	(128)	Š 13.96
2001/02	0.26	(24.39)	(32.27)	(51)	Š 19.82
2002/03	0.28	(57.45)	(61.82)	(48)	Š 20.18
2003/04	0.36	(20.27)	(19.64)	(33)	Š 9.08
Average	1.34	(35.25)	(40.39)	(59)	- 8.48

Sensitivity analysis

- Like all complex analysis we have to deal with estimates for some key numbers, for example how much malting quality was available in each year
- In our sensitivity analysis we change these numbers to see if they impact our results . They did not.

Conclusions

- The single desk of the CWB earned producers on average an additional \$59 million per year for the 1995/96 to 2003/04 period
- This additional revenue was earned through malting premiums that would greatly diminish in the absence of the single desk (These premiums would diminish on both side of the border)
- There is no evidence that marketing and transportation costs would decrease in a multiple seller environment

Discussion

- The CWB has become a very divisive issue in the farm community.
- Do we have to have a winner take all outcome?
- Is there some middle ground? Where is it?
- What processes can we use?

Discussion

- Our results show that the CWB has very little impact on the domestic feed market. Is there a way to give more marketing choice in feed barley without disrupting the malting barley market?
- Are the ways to prevent Canadian “feed barley” export from competing with malting sales?